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Tax Policy and the Dividend Clientele Effect
Summary
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) significantly changed tax policy by
cutting long-term capital gains tax rates and taxing dividend income at the same rates as long-term
capital gains. Following the reduction in the tax disadvantage of dividends, investors gravitated toward
dividend-paying investments—especially high-income investors who previously had faced the highest tax
rates on dividends.
The behavior of investors before and after the passage of JGTRRA suggests that they divide into
“clienteles” based on dividend payouts when the tax disadvantage of dividends varies across investors.
Policymakers therefore need to build a proper appreciation of investor behavior, particularly among
affluent households, into their thinking about any tax reform proposal affecting capital income. If dividend
clientele effects are ignored, estimates of the revenue that can generated by changes in capital tax rates
will be off-base.
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TAX POLICY AND THE DIVIDEND
CLIENTELE EFFECT
Laura Kawano
In January of 2003, with the economy sagging and the need
for some sort of stimulus becoming a pressing issue, the
Administration of President George W. Bush proposed a package
of tax cuts that would reduce personal taxes, provide a $400-perchild rebate to most families, and increase the rate at which
certain businesses could depreciate equipment, so as to stimulate
small business.
“We cannot be satisfied until every part of
our economy is healthy and vigorous,” Bush
said. “We will not rest until every business
has a chance to grow and every person who
wants to find work can find a job.”1
The centerpiece of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003 ( JGTRRA)—passed by Congress
and signed into law by President Bush six
months after he proposed it—was a vast
reduction in taxes on investment income.
Long-term capital gains tax rates were
cut, and dividend income was now to be
taxed at the same rates as long-term capital
gains (rather than being taxed as ordinary
income). The act, which built upon the 2001
Bush tax cuts, was hailed by Republicans

as a way of bringing immediate benefit to
the middle class, though Democrats were
more than skeptical. New York Representative Charles B. Rangel termed it “an assault
on the middle-class to the benefit of the
wealthy.”2
The aggregate effect of JGTRRA on
the overall economy remains debated. But
the second set of Bush tax cuts—aspects
of which were made permanent during the
Obama Administration—had a large effect
on individuals’ portfolio choices. Highincome investors substantially increased the
dividend yields on their equity portfolios,
according to a study I undertook on the
impact of changes in dividend and capital
gains tax rates brought about by JGTRRA.
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This behavior on the part of wealthy
investors carries important implications for
tax policy—especially now, as tax reform
has become a widely-discussed issue. My
research on the effects of JGTRRA shows
that investors respond to shifts in tax policy
to reduce their tax burdens. Such behaviors
should be taken into account by policymakers seeking to redress the nation’s fiscal deficit by changing tax rates on capital income.3

POLICY CHANGES UNDER
JGTRRA

Figure 1:
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decades prior to 2003, the long-term capital
gains tax rate had been much lower than
the ordinary income rate (except for a brief
period after the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
when dividends and capital gains were both
taxed at 28 percent).

DIVIDEND CLIENTELES
This change in dividend tax rates provides
a rare opportunity to test the “dividend
clientele hypothesis,” the idea that investors sort into “clienteles” based on dividend
payouts. Some have preferences for stocks
that pay dividends while others prefer stocks
whose expected returns come in the form of
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capital gains when the tax disadvantage of
dividends varies across investors. To study
the impact of these tax rate changes on
equity portfolio choices, I used data from
before and after JGTRRA to estimate the
relationship between the dividend yield on
a household’s equity portfolio and the gap
between dividend and long-term capital
gains rates.

75

In the U.S., dividends generally have been
taxed at a higher rate than long-term capital
gains. Due to the progressivity of the tax
system, this tax disadvantage of dividends—
the gap between the tax rates on dividends
and those on long-term capital gains—has
increased with income. The difference
between the dividend tax rate and the longterm capital gains tax rate has been greatest
for people in the highest tax bracket.
Previous studies have shown that an
investor’s optimal portfolio is a function of
the difference between dividend and capital
gains tax rates; for a given level of expected
returns, portfolio dividend yields increase
as the relative tax disadvantage of dividends falls. Before the passage of JGTRRA,
therefore, high-income individuals had a
particularly strong incentive to select stocks
based on dividend payouts because of their
tax implications, avoiding those with high
dividend yields, and investing instead in
those that would deliver returns in the form
of long-term capital gains.
JGTRRA changed this calculation.
With the new legislation, the top marginal
tax rate on long-term capital gains fell
from 20 percent to 15 percent, while the
10 percent rate for lower-income taxpayers
fell to 5 percent (and then to zero percent
in 2008). Also, new qualified dividends now
were taxed in the same way as capital gains
(rather than at the traditional ordinaryincome marginal tax rates).
1 		 New

In sum, the top marginal rate for
dividends fell from 35 percent to 15 percent,
and, for lower-income taxpayers, from 10
percent to 5 percent. The change extended
across dividends from directly owned
equities, as well as those owned through a
mutual fund, partnership, real estate investment trust or common trust fund. This was
a remarkable break with past tax policy. For

Dividend Yield of the S&P 500

The data come from the Surveys of
Consumer Finances (SCF) from 2001, 2004
and 2007. The SCF is a triennial survey
conducted by the Federal Reserve Board
of Governors; each survey samples about
4,500 households. An advantage of using
the SCF for my analysis is that it provides
detailed information on household investments and allows for accurate marginal tax
rate calculations. Also included is information that allows me to control for other,
non-tax-related factors that can influence
portfolio choices, such as age, marital status,
household size, educational attainment, risk
preferences, and optimism about the future
of the economy.

Timing was important to my analysis,
especially since people’s expectations influence their decisions. Capital income tax
cuts were not part of Bush’s 2000 campaign
platform. In fact, reductions in dividend
tax rates were not seriously discussed until
the end of 2002, just before Bush unveiled
plans for his second tax cut in an address at
the Economic Club of Chicago. The data
from the 2001 SCF survey, derived from
equity holdings in 2000, therefore are not
at all affected by JGTRRA, or even by any
anticipation that legislation like JGTRRA
was on the horizon. By 2003, though, it was
clear that dividends probably would be taxed
at a lower rate. The 2004 and 2007 SCF
surveys include dividend receipts from 2003
and 2006, respectively—both of which were
affected by the 2003 act. A comparison of
the data from these years can help shed light
on the impact of the new tax rates.
JGTRRA—the provisions of which
were made retroactive to January of 2003—
represented a major policy shift, and the
investor response was dramatic. Following
the reduction in the tax disadvantage of dividends, investors did in fact gravitate toward
dividend-paying investments. By closing
the gap between tax rates on dividends and
long-term capital gains, dividend income
became more attractive for all investors—but
especially for high-income investors who
previously had faced the highest tax rates on
dividends.
When dividends and capital gains
became taxed similarly, the tax-based incentives for selecting stocks on the basis of dividend yields were dampened. In the same way
that consumers contemplating a big purchase
often choose to drive to another, sales-taxfree state to do their shopping, so did highincome investors seek and find alternatives
that were in their best financial interest.
I estimated that because of the
JGTRRA tax rate changes, households in
the top bracket increased their portfolio
dividend yields by 23 percent between
2001 and 2004. This increase is 13 percent

higher than the increase experienced by
those households one bracket below. Longer
term, the increase for households in the top
tax bracket was even larger—a 35 percent
increase in dividend yields, or almost 18
percent more than those one bracket below.
These responses provide strong evidence for
the dividend clientele hypothesis. That is,
the differential tax treatment of dividends
and capital gains caused a significant degree
of investment sorting.
At the same time, firms also responded
to the tax changes of 2003, increasing their
dividend payments in response to JGTRRA.
According to research by Raj Chetty of
Harvard University and Emmanuel Saez

“If policymakers ignore
dividend clientele effects, their
estimates of the revenue that
will be generated by changes
in capital tax rates will be
off-base.”

of the University of California, Berkeley,
JGTRRA “indeed raised dividend payments
significantly, and in particular induced many
firms to initiate dividend payments.” Chetty
and Saez find that, following a continuous
decline in dividend payments during two
decades, total regular dividends since 2003
have grown by nearly 20 percent.4
There is also some evidence that
dividends were initiated at firms at which
executive compensation was tied to stocks,
so executives who could gain from the introduction of the new tax rates were the ones
who ushered in the increases in dividends.
Perhaps most notably, Microsoft, after long
resisting calls to pay dividends, began a dividend payout for the first time—at rates that
have grown since the initial dividend payout.
As a result, part of the portfolio adjustments that I estimated could have reflected

changes to dividend policies for stocks that
were already held. Regardless, because individuals were able to respond to these firm
changes in payout policies, the tax effects
that I estimated can still be interpreted as
reflecting investor choices.
Nevertheless, it is an important question
to consider how much of the increase could
be attributed to active portfolio shifts. To
help sort out this question, I constructed
hypothetical portfolios from stock market
data for households in each tax bracket
that matched observed portfolio dividend
yields in the 2001 SCF. The increase in
yields for these proxy portfolios for highincome households was only a portion of the
estimated effect of the tax changes. This suggests that active decision-making accounted
for a significant share of the tax effect.
Was investor response to the 2003 act
temporary or permanent? Data measuring
differences between 2001 and 2004, and
then 2001 and 2007, are similar, suggesting
a longer-term shift toward higher dividend
yields. Under the Obama administration, the
new tax rates were extended through 2010,
and then again through the end of 2012.
More recently, the provisions of JGTRRA
eliminating the difference in the way capital
gains and dividend income are taxed were
made permanent. (For individuals in the
highest tax bracket, the tax rate went back
up to 20 percent.) These policy changes
permanently reduced incentives to sort
into dividend clienteles on the basis of tax
considerations.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The investor responses to JGTRRA provide
telling lessons as the nation considers different proposals to reduce its long-term deficit.
Moving forward, policymakers will have to
seriously consider options that either reduce
expenditures, increase revenue from taxes, or,
as is most likely, a mixture of the two. Both
Democrats and Republicans have signaled a
desire to consider fundamental tax reform,

and changes to how capital income is taxed
could be in the mix.
It is important to understand investor
behavior as policymakers consider future
tax reform options. If investment income
tax rates increase, knowing how investors
are likely to react is key to forecasting the
tax revenue implications of such policies.
All other things being equal, taxing capital
income more heavily will increase the tax
burden of high-income taxpayers. However,
my research, and the research conducted
by others, indicates that investors have
shown both a sophisticated awareness of tax
policy and a willingness to adjust portfolio
positions to reduce their tax burdens. The
evidence strongly suggests a dividend clientele hypothesis at work: investors respond
to changes in tax policy, rationally seek the
highest after-tax return, and actively steer
their portfolios accordingly.

Behavioral responses like the clientele
effect carry important consequences for the
impacts of tax policy on the distribution of
tax burdens, especially as equity holdings
have historically been concentrated in the
upper tail of income distribution. Moreover,
if policymakers ignore dividend clientele
effects, their estimates of the revenue that
will be generated by changes in capital tax
rates will be off-base. Policymakers will need
to build a proper appreciation of investor
behavior, particularly among affluent households, into their thinking about any tax
reform proposal affecting capital income.
The views expressed in this paper are those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the
policy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

brief in brief
• The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) significantly changed
tax policy by cutting long-term capital gains
tax rates and taxing dividend income at the
same rates as long-term capital gains.
• Following the reduction in the tax disadvantage of dividends, investors gravitated toward
dividend-paying investments—especially
high-income investors who previously had
faced the highest tax rates on dividends.
• The behavior of investors before and after the
passage of JGTRRA suggests that they divide
into “clienteles” based on dividend payouts
when the tax disadvantage of dividends varies
across investors.
• Policymakers therefore need to build a proper
appreciation of investor behavior, particularly
among affluent households, into their thinking
about any tax reform proposal affecting
capital income. If dividend clientele effects are
ignored, estimates of the revenue that can
generated by changes in capital tax rates will
be off-base.
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